PROMISING YOUNG PLAYERS: Different from the national team, Chinese youth teams perform well in tournaments
　　
　　The World Cup is without a doubt a carnival for football lovers of all nations. Even without the participation of the Chinese national team, this year’s tournament still captivates Chinese football fans, many of whom get up at three o’clock in the morning to catch the latest game.
　　However, while they are immersed in enjoying the World Cup, Chinese fans also feel sorry when they think of the dim future of Chinese football.
　　A move to professionalize the sport was carried out 13 years ago in China. But Chinese football still has not been able to overcome a series of theoretical and systematic problems, and thus the reform plan has been frustrated.
　　Before the 1990s, footballers were trained in government-funded sports schools before they entered teams representing their home provinces, the army and some industries. At that time, there were no professional tournaments and player swaps were banned. If the national football team was scheduled to play a tournament, players were gathered from all parts of the country and trained together.
　　In October 1993, the Chinese Football Association (CFA) decided to implement a reform with the reshuffling of the premier league as a trial base. The CFA tried to make the sport adapt to the market economy through the registration of football clubs, coaches and players, relaxing restrictions on the free movement of players as well as sharing ticket revenues with clubs, so that Chinese football clubs could be transformed into profit makers.
　　By December 31, 1993, football clubs were established in 11 major cities, comprising 24 teams that participated in the Division I and II leagues of 1994. The development of sport stimulated the growth of the football industry and its market. However, many problems were exposed along with the progressive “professionalism,” shocking audiences.
　　“The players didn’t want to improve their skills or feel the joy created by playing sports,” complained a Cameroonian who played for northeast China’s Liaoning club in 2004. “Instead, making money out of each match was all that they cared about. They lacked the spirit of sportsmanship.”
　　
　　Beset by scandal
　　
　　
　　PLAYING ABROAD: Sun Jihai (right), who plays for Manchester City, is the most successful of the overseas Chinese football players
　　
　　On December 5, 1999, Shenyang Haishi played Chongqing Longxin, marking the end of that year’s premier league games. This match was critical to the survival of Haishi, which was in danger of losing its ranking in the league and being ejected. In the first half, Longxin was ahead 1:0 but the advantage was overturned dramatically in the second half. In injury time, the Longxin goalkeeper seemed to help the ball float into his own net accidentally. That helped Haishi remain in the Division I League.
　　After the match, the media were abuzz, and some exposed the scandal behind the contract of the two clubs. Pressured both by media and fans, the CFA investigated the affair. In March 2000, the association announced the result, claiming there was a lack of evidence of match fixing, and fined each club 400,000 yuan for passive play. This was probably the worst scandal in the
　　history of Chinese football, and from then on, league matches were plagued by cheating rumors.
　　In 2004, the Division I League was upgraded to the Chinese Super League (CSL) and 12 teams participated. However, the change of name did not help to improve the quality. That year, Liu Jiansheng, a goalkeeper with the Liaoning club, was detained for drug use. Worse still, rumors about Liaoning’s players being involved in gambling almost ruined the reputation of the whole CSL.
　　In 2003, China Central Television (CCTV) decided to stop live broadcasts of CSL games, after 10 years of cooperation. The broadcasting rights to the 2004 season were transferred to the Shanghai Media Group. CCTV owned almost all the broadcasting rights for international football matches in China, but it abandoned broadcasting national games. The fundamental reason behind this is the dispute over the actual market value of the CSL.
　　“We judge the value of the CSL from the view of the market economy. But the broadcasting rights to the tournament now are priced as high as $30,000 per game, with only the finals of the Olympics and the World Cup exceeding that price. It is unreasonable,” a CCTV insider commented.
　　For the CSL, misfortune came in batches. Rolf Beisswanger, the head of sponsorship at Siemens, the German technology giant, announced that the company would stop sponsoring the tournament because of a change in market strategy. The stated reason, according to insiders, was that Siemens hadn’t achieved the expected result by sponsoring the CSL. However, many football experts suspected there were two major reasons. Perhaps Siemens believed that the chaotic administration and cheating
　　incidents of the CSL would not benefit the company’s reputation or its influence in China. The withdrawal of CCTV from broadcasting the tournament is thought to have constituted the other important reason for Siemens’ decision.
　　Without any sponsors, the CSL’s 2005 season was caught in a dilemma. Iphox, a British Internet communications company, said it was willing to sponsor the games from 2006. However, confronted with potential difficulties, it’s uncertain how long Iphox will sustain that pledge.
　　
　　Poor management
　　
　　On October 2, 2004, Beijing Hyundai, a leading team, walked off the field due to dissatisfaction with the referees. Subsequently, the punishment imposed by the CFA on the Hyundai team ignited
　　long-standing conflicts between the CFA and football clubs, which led to a so-called “October Revolution” in Chinese football development when seven clubs threatened to boycott the CSL.
　　The CFA has sole ownership of China’s football tournaments, although the CSL charter stipulates that an operating company is to be established. The China Football Industry Development Corp., wholly controlled by the CFA, monopolizes the management and operation of the CSL. As for football clubs, they can only receive their share of ticket revenues and develop some poster advertisements, which is the least desirable form of advertising and has been abandoned by the CFA. Moreover, the association has the final say in nearly all of the issues created by the matches.
　　Consider the English Premier League, in contrast. An alliance of different clubs manages the tournament and the concerned official department, the Football Association, only has a small role. In addition, the revenues from league matches are distributed by the alliance according to the achievement of each football team, most of which goes to the clubs. In contrast, the property rights and profit distribution of the CSL are in chaos, leading to football clubs’ discontent.
　　Dalian Shide, another top team, representing rebel clubs, demanded the establishment of an alliance of investors and the return of the rights to the clubs. In a meeting, the CFA and club investors reached an agreement to balance their interests: The association agreed to publicize that year’s budget of the CFA, suspend relegation in 2004-05 and establish a special squad for football reform.
　　Though the “October Revolution” came to an end as a result of mutual concessions, the CFA is well aware of the necessity of an overhaul.
　　“Chinese football reform should establish and develop the modern property system and improve the management structure based on the requirements of a modern corporate governance system so that a balanced system of supervision, decision-making and operation can be formed. Only by doing this can the CSL maintain a healthy and sustainable development,” said the CFA’s Managing Vice Chairman Xie Yalong.
　　
　　Overseas failures
　　
　　In the 1990s, some Chinese footballers such as Sun Jihai and Yang Chen were selected to play for European clubs. Since then, more Chinese football players have begun to play overseas. However, compared with their South Korean and Japanese counterparts, Chinese players do not have an easy exit route. Most of them are not elite players on their respective teams and, facing pressure from an exotic environment, injuries and limited personal strength, many give up.
　　One agent pointed out, “First, most Chinese players cannot speak English, second, there are stricter access restrictions on non-EU players in European football powers, and third, which is the key reason, the transfer fees proposed by Chinese clubs, which European clubs believe are astronomical, frighten away the buyers. In any case, Chinese football is still at a low stage of development.”
　　Some industry commentators point out that it is unrealistic for Chinese players to immediately set foot in the leading European leagues. It is better for them to choose a second-rank club first and then seek further development.
　　Chinese football also implements a “bringing in” policy by attracting foreign players and coaches. Former German and Bayern Munich striker Carsten Jancker signed a contract with Shanghai Shenhua in 2006. Former Brazil head coach Sebastiao Lazaroni and head coach of the Serbia-Montenegro team at World Cup 2006, Ilija Petkovic, have coached in China.
　　Shen Xiangfu, former head coach of the Chinese U23 team, noted that the introduction of these foreign coaches played a significant role in improving the overall quality of both Chinese coaches and players and they have substantially enhanced the players’ confidence.
　　
　　A lack of style
　　
　　No feature is the biggest feature of the Chinese team. The judgment was reportedly made by Iran head coach Branco Ivancovic at the 2004 Asian Cup games. For all these years, the biggest defect of Chinese football has been the lack of its own style.
　　Almost all countries skilled in football have their own winning ways like the “samba” style of Brazil and Italy’s defensive and opportunistic strategy. In Asia, 20 years ago, Japanese football was ranked second rate but Japanese footballers adhered to imitating and popularizing the Brazilian style. As a result, they made remarkable headway and now even pose a threat to powerful European teams.
　　In contrast, Chinese football has always swayed between various styles of other countries, without developing its own characteristics. Thus, it has been difficult for the Chinese team to gain the upper hand against Asian opponents.
　　In contrast to the national team, the Chinese youth teams have achieved a more satisfactory result. When those players grow older, however, they gradually lose the advantage and become mediocre. For this phenomenon, some insiders explained, “The Chinese youth teams emphasize teamwork rather than cultivating the players’ individual characteristics.”
　　This training method pays off in the early period in their career development, they explained, but at the same time it impedes the development of individuality. When later confronted with a team that has both wonderful cooperation and strong individuality, naturally they will lose the game.
　　“The overemphasis on tactics is not good for cultivating the players’ individuality. As a result, their original advantage is lost,” said Zhou Weimin, Director of the Football Teaching Office of Yunnan Normal University.

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